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I. Introduction and Policy Conclusions 
        The regulated taxi marketplace is an industry sector undergoing a period of dynamic 
disruption due to the entrance of ridesourcing2 companies such as Uber, Lyft, and 
Sidecar.  Following the example of Rayle et al.  I “refer to these services as ‘ridesourcing’ 
because [I] believe it succinctly conveys the essential technology – a platform used to ‘source’ 
rides from a driver pool” (Rayle 2). While the firms designate themselves as ‘ridesharing,’ 
“ridesourcing drivers usually do not share a destination with passengers; instead, the driver’s 
motivation is fare income” (Rayle 2).   
As a sector, the American Taxi and Limousine Services industry will generate $11.2 
billion in revenues through over 250,000 employees in 2014 (Brennan 31).  Estimates by 
IBISWorld indicate that revenue totals grew at an average annual pace of 3.2% from 2009 to 
2014, a pace that is likely to increase due to the rising popularity of ridesourcing services 
(Brennan 3).  Ridesourcing services through mobile transportation applications3 represent a new 
sub sector within the taxi and limousine industry.  Given industry profit levels of $911 million in 
2014, the marketplace represents a large business opportunity for ridesourcing firms, and a 
strong incentive for taxicab operators to delay disruption (Brennan 3).  As private firms, 
ridesourcing’s impact on the sector’s growth can only be estimated; as will be shown, early 
predictions and information display an increase in the marketplace. That is, entrance into the 
marketplace has increased, as drivers and consumers rapidly adopt ridesourcing as an alternative 
to taxicabs.  However, local governments regulate and restrict taxicab entry, fares, services, and 
quality in the vast majority of urban areas.  Limousine services face a different regulatory 
environment than taxicab services that will be discussed at a later point.  This report aims to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Regulators often call these firms TNCs, or Transportation Network Companies. 
3 Here and throughout the paper, applications refers to mobile applications that typically run on 
smartphones and other mobile devices.	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provide an economic analysis of taxicab regulations, examine past experiences with reform, and 
illustrate the altered taxicab and ridesourcing marketplace.  Following the example of Pautler & 
Frankena, among others, I conclude “that no persuasive economic rationale is available for some 
of the most important regulations” (Pautler 1).  
Given the conclusion on the industry and marketplace, questions remain surrounding the 
appropriate regulation of ridesourcing applications and the displacement effects on the taxi 
marketplace.  Specifically, questions surrounding insurance liability, driver backgrounds, and the 
use of consumer information surround ridesourcing applications.  As ridesourcing companies 
utilize smartphone applications, they gain access to consumer locations in a new and unique 
manner; such information might require additional regulation as ridesourcing develops 
further.  Much like other data driven companies - such as Facebook and Google - a firm’s ability 
to understand consumer preferences allows for targeted marketing strategies.  For instance, a 
ridesourcing firm’s ability to know a person’s exact location might allow restaurants to notify 
consumers of specials upon their arrival to a new neighborhood.  The pros and cons of data 
proliferation will be examined in the upcoming innovation section.       
Within the taxi sector, uncertainty envelops the future of taxi medallions and medallion 
investments.  The cost structure of taxis, where most drivers lease vehicles and medallions from 
medallion owners, means drivers face the economic risks and financial burdens of low demand, 
while medallion owners continue processing rent payments; thus, concerns arise for the 
economic well being of these lower income workers.  This lease system with flat rent payments 
has existed since 1979, and “by the mid-1980s nearly all drivers (except owner-drivers) were 
lessees” (Schaller Consulting 25).  The entrance of ridesourcing companies decreases the value 
of taxi medallions, and raises questions regarding their value in a potentially open marketplace. 
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II. Taxi Market Regulation Rationales: Pre-Ridesourcing 
        Here the taxi market refers to the aspect of urban public transportation that includes 
cruising cabs, cab stand cabs, and radio dispatch cabs.4 Cruising cabs operate in large downtown 
areas where there “is a high density of potential riders at random locations” (Pautler 12). Taxicab 
stands appear near high demand locations – airports, train stations, hotels, etc. – and rely on a 
predictable stream of riders.  Lastly, radio dispatch cabs provide service to less frequented 
locations upon request.  While each market sector faces slightly different challenges, as a whole 
they face five main areas of regulation. 
“The five areas of regulation are: entry restrictions; fare controls, restrictions on the types 
of service offered, such as ride sharing; requirements to provide certain amounts of service; and 
quality regulations, which concern vehicle safety, driver qualifications, and liability insurance 
coverage” (Pautler 2). The stated goal of taxicab regulation is to protect against alleged market 
imperfections and the potential for inefficient resource allocation.  Maximum efficiency serves 
as the primary economic benchmark with which to measure the taxicab marketplace.  Economist 
Lynne Pepall describes economic efficiency:  
A market outcome is said to be efficient when it is impossible to find some small change 
in the allocation of capital, labor, goods, or services that would improve the well being of 
one individual without hurting any others….If we can imagine changes that would 
somehow allow one person to have more goods and services while nobody else has less, 
then the current market outcome is not efficient. (Pepall 28) 
 
Within the taxicab marketplace, intricacies such as wait time, cost, and the well-being of local 
citizens contributes to efficiency. For instance, the ability to more quickly match drivers and 
riders promotes efficiency within the marketplace.  Waiting time and clear information regarding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Limousines, black cars, and liveries operate outside the taxicab regulatory environment, and 
therefore will not be immediately discussed.  Black cars and liveries differ in that black cars 
must take 90% of there payments through contracts.  Liveries offer service to all individuals on a 
prearranged basis.  Lincoln Town Cars are typical for both types (Bloomberg 12).   
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price most clearly promote efficiency for consumers, as do safety standards.  The following 
indicates the rationale for each aspect of taxi regulation as it relates to efficiency.  What began as 
an open marketplace now stands as one of America’s most heavily regulated industry sectors.  
Pricing represents the foremost requirement in regulation. By regulating fares through a 
standard pricing model that includes time and distance, authorities specify the required fare. 
Fares must be clearly posted in plain view.  Moreover, it is commonplace for additional fees for 
such things as tollways, airport pick-ups and drop-offs, additional passengers, and waiting times. 
Price controls aim to protect both consumer consumers and drivers.  Riders face higher 
transaction and search costs than drivers; without price controls, drivers – especially cruising 
cabs – possess the ability to discriminate against riders due to an information gap between the 
two parties.  Similarly, large dispatch services benefit from economies of scale, which could 
allow them to utilize monopoly pricing in the marketplace.  A rider’s inability to easily compare 
taxi fares represents the first information problem solved by government regulation.  On the 
other hand, price controls protect cabstand taxis against a Bertrand competition that would drive 
price down.  Bertrand competition is based on price competition, where consumers will chose 
between two identical options based on price.  In this model, “firm two could capture the entire 
market by selecting any price lower than [firm one’s price],” likewise, firm one’s best response 
is to set a very low price (Pepall 244). In such a model, competition incites firms to put prices at 
marginal cost rather than sell nothing.  Because Bertrand competition is unprofitable for firms, 
legislators might protect produces by enacting.  Given these factors, the “existence of an 
equilibrium depends on the regulation of fares,” and fare ceilings may increase efficiency in the 
taxi marketplace (Cairns).  While the extreme of a regulated price would be government 
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mandated prices, cities have historically only set fare ceilings5.  As will be discussed later, price 
controls served as the major point of contention during previous attempts at deregulation. 
        If price controls are in place, a second best rationale becomes necessary to ensure service 
requirements and taxicab operation levels.  That is to say, “given that one of the Paretian 
optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum situation can be achieved only by 
departing from all the other Paretian conditions” (Lipsey 2). Thus, regulations restrict entry and 
maintain service requirements for all trips.  Theoretically, restrictions on entry aim to move 
supply to be in line with the regulated price. Prices may be set above the efficient level so as to 
ensure higher quality of life standards for drivers, among other possible factors6.  The efficient 
price level refers to the equilibrium price in an unregulated marketplace given the supply of 
drivers and demand of consumers; that is, perfectly efficient prices would be set at the level that 
equals supply and demand. If taxi fares are set above the efficient level, an inefficiently large 
number of cabs may be induced to enter the industry, thus justifying entry restrictions.  
Therefore, “if a city does conclude that the number of cruising cabs is inefficiently high, the 
problem would be inefficiently high fares” rather than lax entry requirements (Pautler 41).  
Policy makers state a lower supply of taxicabs also aims to protect against both 
congestion and pollution.   On the extreme end, regulators might argue that “free entry would 
lead to downtown areas clogged with taxicabs,” however this “is refuted by the experience of 
cities such as Washington, D.C., which has not restricted entry,” although geography and density 
cannot be completely discredited (Pautler 41).   Moreover, taxicab restrictions may not even 
bring a decline in congestion if they increase the number of private automobiles and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Regulation states that taxicabs must clearly post prices within vehicles.  With the existence of 
only fare ceilings, it is possible for different firms to have different prices in the same city. 
6 Regulations set ceilings on both fares and taxicab lease payments, therefore it would be 
possible to promote a driver’s quality of life through regulation.	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accompanying parking problems (Barlett 7). With regard to pollution, regulating vehicle 
emissions as a whole, rather than the number of cruising taxicabs, would better induce higher air 
quality.  If policymakers consider pollution a strong enough incentive to limit taxicabs, stronger 
emissions standards must be applied to the automobile industry as a whole.  Thus, strong 
arguments indicate congestion and pollution do not represent sufficient reasoning for entry 
restrictions.                
Information problems – such as an individual’s inability to judge vehicle safety and 
insurance coverage – lead to additional regulation requirements.  Safety requirements protect 
riders against unsafe vehicles and reduce the probability of potential injuries, and insurance 
requirements protect riders from financial liability.  Because of the consumer’s inability to fully 
gauge a vehicle’s safety, government regulations should ensure regular vehicle checks and 
require driver background checks as a means to improving the consumer’s safety and peace of 
mind. Other aspects of quality, such as car cleanliness and the level of service provided might 
not require regulation because they are factors that influence the level of a driver's tip, although 
laws state taxicabs must be clean.  A potential tip incentivizes drivers to maintain a clean car and 
provide friendly service, but additional means might be necessary for higher quality. 
Because price, entry, and vehicle safety represent potential market inefficiencies, 20th 
century policy makers aimed to regulate the industry accordingly.  Standard fares are set, barriers 
to entry exist, and vehicle inspections and insurance are required.  By examining each aspect of 
regulation in greater depth, and its coinciding instances of deregulation, it is possible to gain a 
clearer picture of the taxi marketplace.     
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III. Regulation Inefficiencies        
        Regulation’s costs stem from regulation policies that actually might decrease efficiency 
rather than increase it.  The main imperfection comes from an inability to properly determine 
efficient levels of regulated price and taxicab supply.  Agencies that determine fare levels, which 
have administrative costs themselves, have difficulty setting efficient fares, or may choose fares 
due to other considerations.  For instance, Verkuil reports “rate regulation in New York is 
completely haphazard,” indicating regulators do not set fares in an economically efficient 
manner (Pautler 67). That is to say, fares were not initially set in a manner that best reflects the 
variable costs and reflects the intricacies of supply and demand. As regulators raise fares due to 
inflation, the initial misguided price structure remains. The table below displays how New York 
City fares have changed over time.  If regulations are not set in a manner aimed at promoting an 
efficient outcome, they simply promote continued inefficiency within the marketplace.   
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Table 1: New York City Taxicab Fares 1952-2006 
 
(Schaller Consulting 18) 
Examining the New York City fares adjusted for inflation demonstrates that fare increases 
throughout the last century have been primarily responses to inflation.  Table 2 demonstrates that 
real fare rates have changed little during the past half century. 
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Table 2: New York City Real Taxicab Fares  
(Schaller Consulting 18) 
        Regulation’s official goals do not align with the actual outcome. Instead, it is possible 
that regulation protects special interests such as those of taxi medallion owners. Pautler makes 
two key points regarding regulation inefficiencies in the taxi marketplace.  First, “most 
regulations impose an inefficient uniformity on the market,” meaning the taxicab marketplace 
becomes uniform in most (Pautler 67). For instance, fare regulation leads to an inefficient 
allocation of resources during both peak and off-peak periods.  Higher fares during high demand 
periods correlate with basic economic principles given the restricted supply. However, cities 
utilize surcharges in a limited manner that does not adequately reflect increases in demand; for 
instance, New York City charges riders $1 extra for a ride taken between 4 and 8 pm (NYC Taxi 
& Limousine Commission).  Secondly, “evidence suggests that taxi ordinances and the 
government agencies that regulate taxis may not be motivated primarily by concern for market 
failures and achievement of an efficient resource allocation” (Pautler 68). Other motivations 
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include a desire to protect public transit7, government revenue considerations, promotion of a 
city’s image, and the protection of existing taxi firms from competition.  Because certain 
regulations lack efficiency justification, motivations such as the protection of public transit and 
existing taxi firms from competition stand out as potential regulatory causes.    
        The regulation of supply – the medallion system – most greatly affects efficiency through 
the waiting times associated with hailing a cab.  Open entry would allow increased cab service 
and competition, and decrease waiting time for consumers.  Lower waiting time would serve as 
an improvement in service quality, and thus increase consumer demand.  Taxicab consumers 
stand to benefit the most from supply deregulation.  Considerations for taxicab drivers must be 
made as well because proponents argue that increased supply will decrease driver wages and 
quality of life.  However, it will be argued that increasing the supply of taxicabs decreases rent 
payments that drivers pay medallion owners, rather than decreasing driver wages. 
The information problems encountered by the taxi marketplace since its inception 
represent efficiency’s greatest hurdle.  The taxi-meter solved the information uncertainty 
regarding price, as governments mandated that fares were clearly marked.  However, the ability 
to link riders and drivers still required passenger knowledge of cabstand locations, or 
happenstance encounters with cruising cabs.  For decades, cities relied on taxicab drivers to 
know the landscape and environment on their own.  London represents the extreme case where 
driver applicants must pass a difficult examination “demanding years of study to memorize the 
labyrinthine city’s 25,000 streets and any business or landmark on them” (Rosen).  A taxi 
driver’s success depended on his ability to find customers; therefore, around the clock he must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Public transit refers to areas of the transportation sector that the city operates, normally 
subways and buses.  The protection of public transit refers to making taxi fares expensive as a 
means to induce riders to take public transportation.	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know where potential passengers were located.  A more efficient manner of linking drivers and 
passengers might increase passenger occupancy, and decrease a driver’s idle time. 
Upon entering a vehicle, passengers are at a disadvantage compared to the driver, 
especially if the passenger is in unfamiliar territory.  For the most part, an unfamiliar passenger 
relies on an innate trust for a driver’s route; the passenger simply assumes drivers take the fastest 
route.  Again, the information disparity between drivers and passengers has historically 
represented a potential area for taxicab inefficiencies.  Regulating information, such as requiring 
all taxicabs to utilize a global positioning system (GPS) during each fare, is a logical means to 
negating the information disparity between driver and rider. 
The regulatory system’s stated goal remains to diminish inefficiencies in the taxi 
marketplace.  While the system reduces some inefficiencies, it also fails to reduce some, and 
introduces others.  As technology becomes increasingly more integrated into the average 
person’s life, the opportunity to further decrease marketplace inefficiencies emerges.  Prior to 
examining potential areas of improvement, it is important to better understand the taxi 
marketplace.  
IV. The Medallion System 
        In most metropolitan cities across the United States, the taxicab medallion system 
regulates and restricts the number of cabs within the city. Major cities including New York City, 
Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, Miami, Houston, San Francisco, and Seattle utilize some form of the 
medallion system as a regulatory tool.  By definition: 
A taxi medallion is a metal plaque placed on the outside of a taxicab to present 
physical evidence that the vehicle is licensed to be used as a taxicab.  The 
medallion is not assigned to a driver.  The owner of the medallion is entitled to 
receive the revenue stream generated by the medallion, and can hire a driver to 
operate a taxicab, or lease the right to use the medallion to a driver (Barlett 4). 
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Medallion proponents state they protect citizens through licensing requirements such as 
background checks and fleet sizes; while both requirements could be regulated without 
medallions, the current structure links the ability to hold or lease a medallion to them. By 
artificially restricting the taxicab market, the medallion system creates barriers to entry in 
America’s largest cities.  An oversupply of New York City taxicabs – with levels reaching 
around 21,000 in 1931 – led to a 1937 ordinance restricting the number of licenses at 13,595.  As 
of 2014, New York City had 13,437 taxi medallions on the market, which authorize “yellow 
taxicabs with medallions … to pick up passengers by street hail anywhere in New York City” 
(Bloomberg 12).  World War II led to a decrease in the number of New York City taxicabs to 
11,414 in 1947, and limited medallion issuances occurred until 1996.   Annual passenger trips 
have increased 16% from 204 million in 1990 to 236 million in 2014 in New York City, while 
medallions increased 14% from 11,787 to 13,437 over that same period (Schaller Consulting 30, 
Bloomberg 2).  
Since the 1970s, the majority of taxi drivers lease taxi medallions from owners. The 
medallion owner provides insurance, branding, and access to the vehicle in exchange for a flat 
fee paid by the leasing driver.  Shifts last 12 hours, and lease options include both daily and 
weekly leases.  The system shifted drivers from employees of the taxicab company to 
independent contractors operating on their own accord.  “Leasing allowed fleets to drop 
employee benefits which drivers had previously enjoyed, including health and pension benefits, 
employer contributions to Social Security, scholarships, legal services, unemployment insurance 
and disability insurance” (Schaller Consulting 27). Thus, the driver takes on the financial and 
economic risks of uncertain consumer demand while the medallion owner receives flat, 
guaranteed payments.  Furthermore, the leasing arrangement has relieved owners “of their 
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obligation to comply with U.S. labor laws involving wages, benefits, and the maximum workday 
of eight hours” (Cumming 13). The leaser typically rents the medallion and vehicle each week 
for a specific set of shifts, allowing medallion owners to have multiple leasers per medallion.   
        The medallion system creates a cartel that protects the owners of taxi medallions due to 
the classification of transportation as a public utility.  Guaranteed income from driver leases, as 
well as market protection against new entrants, have made medallion prices increase 
greatly.  Pautler describes how taxi medallions gain their value, given the market in which they 
operate: “If entry were restricted and the right to operate a taxi could be sold or leased, 
medallions would command a price or rental equal to the present discounted value of the positive 
profits” (Pautler 34).  In contrast, in a competitive market, firms would enter the taxi industry 
until profits equaled zero at the government imposed fare. 
Since the leasing system began in the 1970s, the price of a New York City taxi medallion 
has increased from about $50,000 in 1976 to $1,320,000 in 2014 – with the largest growth 
coming in the 21st century. 
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Table 3: New York City Taxi Medallion Sale Prices 
8 
(Bloomberg 12) 
 
The average annual price of independent medallions increased 260% between 2004 and 
2012 while the average annual price of mini-fleet medallions increased 321% over the 
same time period.  When accounting for inflation, prices still increased 214% for 
independent medallions and 265% for mini-fleet medallions.  The annualized return on 
investment (ROI) for a medallion over this time would be about 19.5%.  In comparison, 
over the same time, the ROI for a similar investment in the S&P 500 would yield a 3.9% 
annual return. (Bloomberg 12)   
 
While the medallion system began in most major cities in the 1930s, the ability to lease 
medallions greatly increased their value. New York City represents the high end of the spectrum, 
all other cities have seen prices rise as well.9  “These values capture the degree to which the 
markets are restricted by these medallions,” and represents the high returns medallion owners 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Independent medallions are classified so owners may only own one medallion, and the owner is 
often obligated to drive a minimum number of shifts annually. Income is generated through fares 
as well as lease fees to other drivers.  
Mini-fleet medallions must be owned in a group of at least two.  Incomes are derived from lease 
fees paid by drivers (Bloomberg 12).  
9 Notable peak medallion prices include Boston at $700,000; Philadelphia at $400,00; Chicago at 
$350,000; Miami at $300,000; and San Diego at $140,000 (Badger 3).	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gain from leases (Barlett 1).  The massive increases in the value of medallions reflect the income 
streams that owners obtain from their taxi driver operators.    
With over 50,000 drivers in New York City, the supply of drivers is more than four times 
the number of available taxis at a single point in time (Bloomberg 9). The large supply of drivers 
means taxi medallion owners can lease medallions out for multiple shifts per week, thus 
minimizing vehicle idleness and increasing the worth of medallions.  Naturally, utilizing the 
same vehicle for multiple shifts decreases external costs such as vehicle maintenance and 
cleaning relative to each driver maintaining his own vehicle.  The taxi industry attracts a large 
number of drivers because of “low entry costs, the opportunity to service ‘guaranteed’ trips at a 
cab stand and the opportunity to work for oneself” (Schaller 492).  Therefore, by limiting the 
number of taxicabs on the road, medallions in essence protect the income of working drivers by 
ensuring an over-demand for rides.   
Conversely, the large supply of drivers allows for high flat lease fees that make 
medallions valuable.10 Because being a taxicab operator is appealing to many individuals, 
medallion owners gain the ability to charge drivers high lease payments.  The desire to ensure 
driver well being was partially discussed in regards to fare regulations, however, regulating lease 
payments appears to be a more impactful way of raising a driver’s income.  Following the 
exhibit of New York City medallion prices, the mathematics behind medallion prices directly 
relates to driver lease payments. New York City’s 50,000 taxicab drivers compared to 13,437 
medallions exhibits an excess demand11, helping raise rent prices drivers are willing to pay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Like fares, taxi lease fees are legally regulated by taxi commissions by placing lease ceilings 
on medallions 11	  Theoretically, there are a maximum of 26,874 taxi shifts available each day if each taxicab is 
leased for a double shift.  Additionally, 45% of cabs are leased long term, demonstrating a desire 
for scheduled shifts (Schaller Consulting 33).   
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medallion owners.  Beyond supply and demand, medallion serve as an investment instrument for 
owners. Thus, considering the fact that New York City cab drivers lease vehicles for a maximum 
of $1,587 per week12, medallion owners can earn a total $82,524 in a year (Salmon).  Thus, New 
York City medallions act as bonds with real yields of $82,524 before vehicle expenses.  
Estimating expenses of $30,000 a year and a 3.5% interest rate13, a fair price for medallion 
would be $1,485,714 at present value.  Investors price medallions according to future cash 
payments, accounting for investment risk by utilizing a higher discount rate than United States 
Treasury Bonds.  Given the recent low interest rate environment, many medallion owners 
financed their medallions with debt, and pay them off through the collected lease payments.  
Thus, it is through the medallion’s ability to be leased that it gains its value. 
In reality, the taxicab medallion marketplace maximizes rent payments to medallion 
owners rather than earnings to taxicab riders.  Medallion owners extract the surplus via driver 
lease fees and have had high returns since 1980.  In summation:  
there is broad consensus among economists that such restrictions allow a small 
group of private citizens - those who are among the first round of recipients of 
medallions - to earn windfall profits at the expense of consumers and taxicab 
drivers who don’t receive medallions in the first round. (Barlett 1)  
 
Those who most benefitted from the medallion system purchased or were given 
medallions in the earliest years, before they gained significant value.  In today’s 
environment, it should be assumed that medallion prices closely relate to their 
equilibrium or fair value based on potential lease fees. It is the dramatic increase in prices 
since 2004 that is most staggering.  It must be assumed that demand for taxi service 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 $105 for day shifts, $129 for Thursday-Saturday night shifts, $115 for Sunday-Tuesday night 
shifts, and $120 for Wednesday night shifts; or $630 for any one-week day shift, and $737 for 
any one week night shift (NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission) 
13 U.S. Treasury yields for 30 Years are 2.59% as of April 21, 2015.	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generates increased demand to become a taxi driver, and therefore increased demand to 
lease a medallion from owners.  The most noticeable change in the marketplace was 
consistently low real interest rates.  Such rates increased the number of individuals able 
to bid on medallions and provided them the opportunity to finance their investment with 
affordable levels of debt. 
V. Taxi Drivers and the Medallion System 
 Taxicab drivers enter into the taxi labor force due to the ease of entry into the job and 
lack of skill required.  In New York City, 94.1% of taxicab-licensed drivers are immigrants, and 
99% are males (Bloomberg 9).  As low skilled workers, the driver’s employment opportunities 
must be considered.  Therefore, medallion lease fees must be set at a level low enough to induce 
workers to become taxicab drivers rather than another profession which they could choose. Table 
4 demonstrates hourly and mean annual wage for Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs across the top 
metropolitan areas. 
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Table 4: Hourly and Annual Wages for Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs (May 2014) 
 
 Taxicab drivers enter the workforce with knowledge of wages and lease fees because the 
job suits their background and preferences.  The supply of taxicab drivers means drivers earn 
their opportunity cost, while the scarce resource – the taxicab medallion – gain the rents. Thus, 
taxicab drivers, despite potential changes to the system, will earn around their opportunity cost.  
As previously mentioned, the legalization of leasing in 1979 greatly shifted the 
relationship between taxi drivers and medallion owners.14 Leasing placed drivers outside the 
scope of employees and made them independent contractors; as such, medallion owners and 
drivers faced no obligation to comply with American labor laws that include wages, benefits, and 
the maximum eight-hour workday.  Most importantly, the law placed financial risk largely on the 
driver, aside from the insurance mandate covered by the medallion owner. For instance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Prior to 1979, drivers were paid on a commission basis, meaning both medallion owners’ and 
taxicab drivers’ incomes were tied to collected fares.	  
(Bureau	  of	  Labor	  Statistics)	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regulations	  require	  driver	  liability	  insurance	  that	  covers	  up	  to	  $100,000	  per	  individual	  or	  $300,000	  per	  incident	  in	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Los	  Angeles	  (Feeney	  2015,	  10).15	   
Very few drivers actually own a single medallion.  In San Diego, almost 90% of licensed 
drivers are lease drivers; likewise, drivers who lease their taxis “are the large majority of drivers 
in the Chicago taxi industry” (Esbenshade 1, Nelson/Nygaard 2-4).  Similarly, New York City 
has seen a decline in owner drivers, as of 2005 “29% of taxicabs are owner-driven, an all time 
low and down from 37% in 1992” (Schaller Consulting 2). While data are not available for every 
city, across the nation the majority of medallion owners do not ever operate a taxicab.  As a 
lessee, the taxi driver faces expenses for the lease payment, gas payments, and miscellaneous 
costs such as car washes, cell phone service, tickets, and credit card fees; as a whole, these 
expenses account for about 70% of the drivers total revenues.  That is, “taxi drivers take home 
only 30 cents of each dollar collected, including tips” (Esbenshade 3). Lease payments alone cost 
San Diego taxi drivers $400 a week for 12 hours a day (Figure 4).  The San Diego State 
University study demonstrates the stress lease payments place on drivers:  
Virtually all (99%) of taxi leases are for either 12 or 24 hours a day, and 86% are 
for 7-day weeks, which encourages drivers to drive long hours to cover the high 
lease costs and other expenses, and still earn even a meager income.  As a result, 
the lease drivers work a median of 71 hours a week.  Almost 80% drive 6 days a 
week or more, with the majority (53%) driving 7 days a week.  On days they 
work, 82% report working at least 10-hour shifts, with the majority (54%) 
working 12 hours or more. (Esbenshade 6) 
 
The median net earnings for San Diego taxicab drivers amounted to $4.45 an hour in 
2013, reflecting why long hours are necessary (Esbenshade 3). In 2014, New York City 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Notable regulations: Washington, D.C. $25,000 per individual and $50,000 per incident; 
Philadelphia $35,000 in liability insurance; Chicago combined single limit of $350,000 per 
incident (Feeney 2015 10)  
	   22	  
taxicab drivers earn a mean annual wage of $15.22 an hour (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
4). 
The high stress environment lease payments place on taxi drivers helps 
demonstrate how medallion owners shift risk away from themselves and onto drivers 
and consumers.  Driver’s assume risk for demand; while each week will have differing 
levels of rider demand, lease payments remain constant. For instance, if a driver 
happens to fall ill during a weeklong lease, he still owes the full lease payment.  This is 
partially why medallion rent payments gained the status of guaranteed income; the 
large supply of potential drivers relative to the controlled medallion supply represents 
the other major factor.  Additionally, a taxi driver’s long hours and the inability to call 
in sick compromises consumers’ and citizens’ safety, because tired and inattentive 
drivers stand as a risk to the general population. 
Taxi drivers also face additional rent payments via credit card transactions. For 
instance, “when passengers pay with credit cards, the dispatch companies usually 
deduct 5% to 10% of the fare, far above the 1% to 2% transaction fee charged by the 
card companies” (Esbenshade 3).  Such a fee represents another example of taxi 
companies extracting additional income from their drivers.  
The guarantee of consistent lease payments created a safe and valuable space 
for investors.  Typically, medallion owners are large investors who own numerous 
medallions; for instance, in San Diego 68% of medallion owners own multiple taxicab 
medallions. In a competitive marketplace – which lacks barriers to entry and exit – “the 
value of the right to serve the market would be zero” (Ennis 3).  
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VI. The Outcome of the Medallion System 
 The medallion system and regulatory environment created a rent system within the taxi 
marketplace.   While numerous taxicab companies exist, the system in place limits supply to a 
point that often fails to meet customer demand16 and discourages progress and development 
within the industry.  “Since all the revenue in the restricted taxicab market...remain concentrated 
in a limited number of hands, medallion owners fiercely resist a possible threat that may 
challenge their advantage” (Barlett 1).  Because the government classified taxis as a public 
utility, in an attempt to provide an essential public service at an affordable rate, the taxi 
marketplace has been severely restricted.  The governmental ideals succeeded in providing 
guaranteed service throughout cities, but they also limited innovation and competition.  The taxi 
cartel17 limited the development of alternative and improved services, encouraged uniformity in 
the marketplace, and increased wait times due to under supply.  “By restricting supply and 
creating high barriers to entry, there is an unmet demand for taxi service, [evidenced by] longer 
wait time for taxis, more non-responses to phone requests, less clean vehicles, poorer quality of 
service and higher fares” (Barlett 6).  Thus the taxi marketplace’s cartel-like system financially 
supports taxi medallion owners, while taxi drivers face high expenses and riders lose time, 
money, and an improved overall experience. 
 The closed entry system maintains the goal of protecting both drivers and 
consumers.  Historically, an oversupply of taxis has led to deterioration in service quality, as will 
be demonstrated through the example of Seattle.  As it relates to both drivers and consumers, 
“proliferation of cabs creates a dysfunctional taxi system that spreads fare revenues too thinly 
across the industry to support quality drivers, vehicles, and dispatch systems and creates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Quantifiable data on unmet taxi demand will be exhibited at a later point.  
17 Cartels are defined as competing firms that exclude entry of competing firms into the market.	  	  
	   24	  
incentives for drivers to shun less profitable trips” (Schaller 501). The goal of protecting driver 
earnings remains admirable, however previous examples demonstrate how the current system 
shifts driver earnings to medallion owners.  The example of Washington D.C. demonstrates that 
more drivers per capita do not necessarily diminish driver earnings.    
The strictly regulated taxi marketplace served a distinct purpose, including protecting the 
American consumer from information inefficiencies surrounding fares, licensing, and vehicle 
standards. As past incidences of taxi deregulation will demonstrate, regulation’s form can 
dramatically shift the market structure.  The innovation and development within the industry 
today will cause rapid changes, growth, and development; with that in mind it is important to 
understand deregulation’s successes and failures.  A shift away from the cartel system can 
greatly benefit both drivers and consumers, but governments must maintain certain regulatory 
measures to protect both parties.  
VII. Examples of Deregulated Environments: Failure and Success 
 Historical incidences of deregulation contain both successes and failures with regard to 
pricing controls and entry requirements.  Two major cities - Seattle, Washington and the District 
of Columbia - represent deregulations divergent potential.  By examining both situations, one 
better understands an open taxi marketplace.      
A. Seattle 
 Prior to 1979, Seattle’s taxicab marketplace allowed for 1 taxicab medallion for every 
2,500 residents, and a fixed system of uniform taxi rates (Zerbe 43).  As population increased, 
new taxi medallions were issued, and valued at about $12,000 (Zerbe 45).  Oversight issues 
within the city council - the governing body that had to approve or deny any rate change - 
created a regulatory body that desired deregulation.  For a number of years, rising gasoline prices 
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and other rising costs led to frequent requests by taxi firms for to raise rates, at which point the 
firms would present their economic and financial rationale to the city council.  The hassle of 
such meetings, as well as a council member’s commitment to decontrol18, helped create a 
deregulatory environment.  
In 1979, Seattle began taxi deregulation by “allowing open entry and permitting 
individual taxi firms to change fares as often as every three months by simply filing new rates” 
(Zerbe 43).  With the intention of increasing taxi supply, creating jobs within the industry, 
lowering fares, and decreasing the administrative costs associated with regulation, the city 
believed deregulation provided strong benefits and an overall net gain.  Fare deregulation 
allowed for different firms to have different rates, and led to an especially dramatic decline in 
rates within the radio dispatch sector relative to the cabstand market (Zerbe 45).  Informed 
consumers and locals are more likely to utilize dispatch services, while vulnerable tourists use 
cab stands, as will be shown.    
By August of 1981, “the number of city-licensed cabs rose by around 21 percent… and 
the number of taxi companies rose nearly 50 percent” (Zerbe 44).  Deregulation clearly followed 
economic predictions, and increased employment within the industry.  Similarly during a 
period of “rapid general inflation,” 1979-1982, “deregulation helped keep fares down and fares 
fell in real terms” (Zerbe 44).  Quantitatively, “the Seattle Consumer Price Index rose by 90 
percent between 1970 and 1979 while taxicab rates only rose 38 percent during the same period” 
(Leisy 5). The final major implication relates to medallion licenses, which fell from a high of 
$12,000 during the period to a value of about zero - as should be expected in a deregulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Councilman Randy Revelle had a “personal commitment to decontrol” and was backed by 
economists from the city’s Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs (Zerbe 44). 
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environment. The decline in medallion value illustrates that within the medallion system, 
regulations place taxicab fares above the competitive level.   
However, Seattle’s historic deregulation was hardly a complete success. The cabstand 
market - about 40 percent of the Seattle marketplace at the time - witnessed significant problems. 
At Seattle’s King Street railroad station, there was a drastic taxi driver oversupply.  Long cab 
lines, with both major cab fleet drivers and independent drivers, occurred and caused instances of 
“physical intimidation, of drivers who lied about the availability of bus service, who were 
slovenly, vulgar, and rude” (Zerbe 46). At the Sea-Tac airport where taxi drivers approached 
customers one at a time after being called up from a standby lot, taxis “were able to set their 
fares as high as they wished so long as they could find enough customers to pay,” demonstrating 
how a lack of regulation led to price discrepancies, premium fares, and unprofessional business 
practices (Zerbe 46).  As might be assumed, the high airport prices led to an increase in the 
supply of taxis, a decrease in the number of fares collected per driver, and therefore failed to 
promote a drivers’ well-being.  Less frequent fare opportunities also led to a service refusal for 
short fares driver’s considered not profitable enough.    
Service quality deterioration stands out as a major downfall of Seattle’s deregulated 
taxicab marketplace.  The severe driver influx led to instances of dirty cabs, inexperienced and 
unknowledgeable drivers, and an overall decrease in ride quality. Seattle’s experience 
demonstrates the many positives of deregulation, especially lower overall fares and a larger 
supply of drivers; however, information issues allowed taxicab drivers to inflict additional costs 
upon consumers.  The lack of medallion leases created a general lack of oversight detrimental to 
quality within the marketplace.  Uninformed consumers faced a marketplace where drivers 
controlled the price without strict posting requirements, which led to an increase in the average 
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fare from the airport.  Consumers might “pay $25 for a ride from the airport to downtown Seattle 
and only $16 for the return trip” (Zerbe 46).  The passenger complaints regarding price gouging 
and short trip refusal helped lead to a 1984 ordinance “which partially reregulated the taxicab 
industry.   The taxicab ordinance was revised to establish a rate ceiling 10% above the average of 
rates filed on January 1 of each year” (Leisy 8). In 1990, Seattle again fixed the number of 
taxicab licenses with a medallion system. 
One study claims that Seattle’s deregulation failed because the taxicab industry “fails to 
reflect the perfect competition model described in microeconomic textbooks” (Dempsey 
102).  The most glaring omission from a competitive market is that “passengers have perfect 
knowledge of rates so that they won’t pay more than the lowest rate,” whereas in Seattle 
passengers could not easily compare driver rates (Leisy 7).  However, the benefits seen in Seattle 
demonstrate the potential advantages a more competitive taxi marketplace might pose for both 
drivers and consumers; a consumer’s ability to more quickly compare prices, relay information, 
and judge drivers would create a more successful competitive marketplace.           
B. Washington D.C.  
 The nation’s capital implemented one of the most deregulated taxi marketplaces in the 
country.  With a system of open entry and no previous instances of regulated supply, the supply 
of taxis is more appropriate for the consumer base, the local population and tourists who use 
taxis.  “Washington D.C. is the one city in North America with open entry in a dense downtown 
cab stand and street hail market.  As a result of open entry, cabs are readily available in 
downtown Washington and in the Capitol area” (Schaller 498).  The free entry system has led to 
a higher ratio of taxicabs per capita, while fares remain lower than those in other large cities 
(Pautler 84). Prior to a 2012 rate hike as mandated by the D.C. Taxicab Commission, the city had 
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the “cheapest rates among 40 major U.S. cities” (Lindeman). Moreover, “even with free entry 
conditions, Washington, D.C., suffers from an undersupply of taxicabs during rush hours, largely 
because the fare structure fails to reflect the increased costs of operation during [rush 
hour].  While the number of taxicabs operating is at a maximum during the middle of the day, 
passengers search in vain for a cab at 5:00 pm”19 (Pautler 88-89).   
 Two charts adequately illustrate open entry’s effects on Washington, D.C.’s taxicab 
marketplace.  Table 5 shows that Washington, D.C. has the highest ratio of taxicabs per 1,000 
residents.  While the higher number of taxicabs per capita would presumably lead to a decreased 
number of trips for each driver, it also leads to decreased waiting times for consumers.  In 
Washington, D.C., taxi rides per capita were “over four times as high as in San Francisco, a 
comparable size city where entry is restricted and fares are higher” (Pautler 89).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Washington, D.C. previously used a zone system, “where fares do not vary with time of day” 
(Pautler 88).  It was not until 2012 that D.C. abandoned the zone system in favor of the more 
common metered system, although there remains no rush hour surcharge (District of Columbia 
Taxicab Commission).  
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Table 5: Population to Taxicab Ratio for Select Cities (2005) 
 
(Schaller Consulting 4) 
Washington, D.C. demonstrates that a lack of entry restrictions leads to a higher ratio of 
taxis per resident.  For instance, in 2005 the District of Columbia had over 12 taxicabs per 1,000 
residents while regulated entry led “auto oriented cities such as Los Angeles, Dallas, and 
Houston, [to] have fewer than 1.2 taxis per 1,000 population” (Schaller Consulting 4) The 
District of Columbia proportionally possesses the largest ratio of taxicabs to population, and the 
increased supply decreases taxicab fares.  “The price of a taxicab ride in the District ranks among 
the lowest for major U.S. cities,” and formerly was the absolute lowest among 40 major United 
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States city until a 2012 rate increase (Whoriskey, Lindeman).  Table 6 displays the previous low 
rates for Washington, D.C. relative to other American cities.20   
Table 6: Total Taxi Fare for one Passenger in Major U.S. Cities (2012) 
 
(Lindeman) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is also logical to assume that the lowest fares in the nation must be increased for inflationary 
purposes. The table demonstrates the fare increase associated with Washington, D.C.’s 2012 shift 
to the metered system from the zone pricing system.  
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Washington, D.C.’s comparison to San Francisco demonstrates that the increased supply, 
lower fares, and decreased waiting times generated four times as many rides in Washington, 
D.C., a city with similar characteristics.  The increase in rides exhibits increased efficiency, 
raises driver earnings, and represents an overall increase in benefits for both drivers and 
consumers. It is probable that an increase in taxicab supply shifts consumers’ consumption 
habits.  As taxicabs become more readily available, individuals become more likely to search 
them out rather than immediately seeking alternative means of transportation. 
 Despite the highest concentration of cabs and among the lowest fares, cab drivers in the 
District of Columbia earn the highest mean hourly wage in the nation (see Table 6). Lower lease 
payments serve as the primary means for the wage difference, as drivers face weekly D.C. taxi 
leases of $180 (Lindeman).  The lack of entry restrictions would serve as the main cause of lower 
lease payments, due to the increase in supply relative to demand.  Therefore, the system of open 
entry decreases medallion values because it decreases the value of lease payments. 
The experience in the District of Columbia illustrates potential improvements for both 
drivers and consumers in an open entry market.  Lower regulated fares, increased rides, and 
lower lease payments improve the marketplace for both drivers and consumers.  It must be 
pointed out that Washington, D.C. benefits from the dominance of the cruising cab    
Table 7: Top Annual Mean Wage of Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs (May 2014) 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
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sector.  Because the major airports that service the city are located in Maryland and Virginia, the 
District of Columbia does not face the cabstand scenario that plagued Seattle’s attempt at 
deregulation.21   
VIII. Creative Destruction and Ridesourcing 
 A. Creative Destruction 
 In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Joseph Schumpeter theorizes that capitalism is 
“by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be 
stationary” (Schumpeter 82). Capitalist modes of production must constantly be evolving and 
improving in order to remain competitive and appeal to changing consumer desires.  In the 
capitalist world, consumer desires determine the marketplace’s winners and losers. Furthermore, 
“the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new 
consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new 
forms of industrial organization that the capitalist enterprise creates” (Schumpeter 83).  
Capitalism requires innovation as a means to progress and continual consumer demand.  As 
consumers, the populace illustrates its desires with dollars, and capitalist desires follow the 
consumer demand.  Thus, Creative Destruction is the pinnacle of market capitalism.  
Organizational development “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter 83).   
 For the past century, taxi marketplaces became closed to new entrants, lacked innovation, 
yet for the most part enjoyed success.  At the same time, For-Hire Vehicles – such as liveries and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Cabs from D.C. are able to service trips to the airports, however taxi drivers cannot legally 
pick individuals up there.       	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black cars – greatly increased in number due to the lack of regulations surrounding them.  In 
New York City, the major regulations for liveries and black cars state that “trips must be 
prearranged, street hailing is not permitted, a wide variety of vehicle types are permitted,22 and 
the system is of open entry” (Bloomberg 2).   Table 8 displays that in a system of open entry for 
For-Hire Vehicles, four times as many cars to entered the marketplace prior relative to taxicab 
medallions.  The proliferation of FHVs represents the first step of creative destruction, but it was 
not until ridesourcing applications created an immediate and more affordable system that the 
taxicab marketplace became threatened. Ridesourcing’s overall appeal to the consumer will 
further its development throughout the United States and abroad.  As will be demonstrated, the 
ability to infiltrate old markets and expand into new territories will generate ridesourcing’s 
success as a continued alternative to taxicabs in the majority of American cities.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Vehicles require inspection once every two years.	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Table 8: New York City’s For-Hire Vehicles   
 
  
B. Ridesourcing  
Ridesourcing represents a new and unique means of linking drivers and riders in the 21st 
century information age.  “Companies such as Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber, have emerged offering 
smartphone applications to link riders with community drivers” (Rayle 2).  As previously stated, 
these platforms source rides from a driver pool and thus will be referred to as ridesourcing 
applications. Unlike ridesharing, ridesourcing drivers are not carpooling, where riders and 
drivers share a single destination (Rayle 2).  Potential riders request rides from private drivers via 
a smartphone application, at which point drivers can accept or deny potential fares.23  Because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Upon receiving a request for a ride, Uber drivers have 13 seconds to accept or decline. 
(Griswold) 	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applications allow consumers to prearrange rides at a moment’s notice, ridesourcing began 
operating within the FHV space.  
Smartphone applications allow for an improved information flow between drivers and 
consumers.  Using modern smartphone technology to connect riders and drivers in real time, 
ridesourcing applications eliminate the need to rely on spotty dispatch service or hail a cab on the 
street.  During the 20th Century, information problems represented one of regulation’s largest 
hurdles.  In an unregulated environment, a lack of information placed taxi consumers at a 
disadvantage relative to taxi drivers; therefore, the marketplace required regulation.  Smartphone 
development has greatly improved the taxi marketplace’s efficiency.  Consumers can call cabs to 
any location and coordinate the efficient route through the use of a maps application. 
Smartphone development greatly improved consumers’ ability to reduce the information 
inefficiencies that represented a previous disadvantage. 
Finally, ridesourcing applications continued the information advancement.  The ability to 
request transportation with a single click rather than a phone call improves the consumer 
experience, decreases consumer wait times, and allows consumers to easily monitor the location 
of their approaching driver.  The increased information greatly decreases one of the taxi 
marketplace’s greatest inefficiencies, consumer waiting time.  Following ridesourcing 
application’s rapid consumer adoption, major taxicab companies throughout the country 
developed their own smartphone applications; however, customer reviews validate ridesourcing 
application’s superiority.  As of April 2015, Uber stood as the 23rd most downloaded 
application within Apple’s App Store, with an average rating of 4.1 stars out of 5 from 15,870 
reviews.  On the other hand, no taxicab application appears in the top 150.  Scale is a major 
reason for this. While Uber and Lyft now operate in most major American cities, taxi 
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companies remain restricted to individual locales, and require a different application in each 
city.  The scope of Uber’s application allows for more downloads and development resources 
compared to the localized taxicab applications.   
Ridesourcing applications create an improved driver and consumer experience.  The 
requirement that drivers and riders rate each other after each fare presents another opportunity to 
improve ride quality.  The peer to peer rating system is an important factor for future rides, as 
drivers with a low overall rating can be removed from the ridesourcing platform and riders can 
be denied future service.  For drivers, the rating system further encourages good behavior during 
each ride, as future rides become dependent on the current consumer experience.  Thus, the 
rating system promotes driver friendliness, quality driving, and a clean vehicle, among 
others.  Likewise, the consumer rating system should improve customer attitudes and discourage 
unlawful behavior during rides.  If either party’s rating falls below a certain level, they are 
automatically flagged and the ridesourcing firm can remove them from the platform.24  Within 
the sharing economy, the rating system represents the key to future benefits, especially for 
drivers.  As consumers can easily switch among ridesourcing platforms, customer satisfaction 
becomes a necessary aspect of the competitive experience.   As	  mentioned,	  both	  drivers	  and	  consumers	  receive	  the	  name	  of	  the	  other	  on	  both	  their	  smartphone	  and	  via	  an	  email	  receipt.	  	  In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  disturbance	  or	  criminal	  offense,	  such	  information	  would	  certainly	  prove	  useful.	  	  Additionally,	  electronic	  only	  payment	  services	  removes	  a	  previously	  dangerous	  aspect	  of	  a	  taxicab	  driver’s	  position,	  where	  drivers	  were	  targeted	  because	  of	  the	  large	  amounts	  of	  cash	  they	  held	  on	  duty.	  	  Table	  9	  displays	  that	  from	  2006-­‐2012,	  taxicab	  drivers	  were	  about	  5	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  suffer	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 If an Uber driver’s rating falls below a 4 out of 5 stars, he can be automatically removed from 
the platform, or be further vetted by the local office.  
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fatal	  injury	  than	  civilians	  in	  other	  occupations.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  cash	  transactions	  and	  lack	  of	  anonymity	  discourage	  violent	  crimes	  from	  both	  parties. 
Table 9: Taxi Driver and Chauffeur Fatal Occupational Injury Rate vs. Total Fatal 
Occupational Injury Rate  
(Feeney 2015, 3) 
Ridesourcing applications’ efficiency and the improved customer experience further 
develop the taxi marketplace.  Improved and safer experiences will induce a greater number of 
future rides and promote the well-being of both drivers and riders.  Ridesourcing’s economic 
rationale aims to completely disrupt the traditional taxi marketplace and replace it with a more 
competitive and innovative experience.  Moreover, ridesourcing applications will greatly factor 
into the shifting automotive industry, as KPMG predicts a shift in consumer preferences away 
from two car households because “mobility-on-demand companies like Uber and Zipcar now 
provide compelling alternatives to ownership, especially in urban areas” (Silberg 3). When 
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compared to the traditional taxi marketplace, ridesharing greatly differs in the most basic market 
principles - supply, demand, competition, and price.   
C.  History and Innovation 
 Ridesourcing’s application platform allows for numerous forms of innovation increased 
product diversification in a new and unique manner. Uber began in March 2009 with its 
UberBLACK platform, a premium service that linked professional livery drivers with high-end 
sedans to riders.25  The service remains within Uber’s current platform, and allows consumers 
with more professional tastes demonstrate their preference through self-selection.  While 
UberBLACK remains more expensive than taxis, it is a premium service.  In July 2012, Uber 
launched its UberX platform, a service that directly competes with local taxi services.  UberX is 
a low cost platform that connects everyday, more basic cars and drivers to local passengers.  
UberX drivers do not typically hold commercial vehicle licenses, which serves as a major point 
of contention for the taxicab industry.  The various platforms within Uber provide consumers 
with quality and fares more in line with their preferences, and allows for continued innovation 
within the ridesourcing sector.  Moreover, both UberBLACK and UberX contain options for 
larger, 6 passenger vehicles, in the form of UberSUV and UberXL respectively.  The ability for 
consumers to choose different sizes, prices, and types of vehicles displays innovation within the 
taxicab marketplace that appeals to consumer’s varying preferences.  
In March 2015, Uber launched UberPOOL in San Francisco, a service that connects local 
riders with similar routes to each other.  Thus, UberPOOL serves as a carpooling application, 
and represents an opportunity to further decrease an individual’s fare.  For Uber, UberPOOL 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Thus, UberBLACK drivers and vehicles are similar or the same as New York City’s 
previously FHVs.  Uber’s model allows for rides to be arranged at a moments notice, and arrive 
minutes later.  While previous black cars utilized set rates based on time or destination, 
UberBLACK prices fares using the traditional meter system.    
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helps with “the idea of providing transportation so inexpensive and reliable, people can sell 
their cars” (blog.uber.com). Through continued innovation, Uber continues to decrease the price 
that consumers pay for fares.  Additionally, innovation expands the marketplace, and provides 
rides the taxicab marketplace is unable or unwilling to offer.  
Uber’s platform also allowed for continued innovation into new and different 
endeavors.  Past promotional services including ice cream trucks, flu shots26, and clothing 
donation pick-ups have demonstrated the firm’s innovative potential.  Providing consumers with 
products they desire, delivered right to their doorsteps displays innovation beyond the typical 
ridesourcing fare.  Additional partnerships with Spotify music service, Captial One credit cards, 
and Starwood Hotels display Uber’s ability to improve the riding experience, gain additional 
clients, and develop further innovation. 
IX. The Ridesourcing Marketplace 
A. Supply   
Ridesourcing applications place minimal restrictions on entry into their platform, 
therefore there is no artificial cap on supply.  A driver is able to join the platform with a 
qualified background check and a usable vehicle, and 160,000 Uber drivers across the country 
have done so (Hall & Krueger 1).  Table 10 exhibits driver supply by location, and demonstrates 
the growth in the supply of drivers over time. As of March 2015, New York City data 
demonstrate that Uber vehicles outnumber traditional yellow cabs, 14,088 to 13,587 (Griswold). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The UberHEALTH promotion distributed free flu prevention packs and optional flu shots from 
a registered nurse for up to 10 people upon request (blog.uber.com) 
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Other cities including Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Miami quickly gained more Uber 
drivers than available medallions.27  
 
 
 
Table 10: Active U.S. Uber Drivers Over Time, by City (January 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite harsh criticism from ridesourcing critics following high profile incidents between 
drivers and riders, ridesourcing applications impose strict background check policies in line with 
those found within the taxicab industry. Given the attention placed on ridesourcing applications, 
driver misbehavior has garnered extra attention from news sources, and especially from taxicab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Number of medallions in each respective city: 1,825; 6,800; 1,413; and 2,040 (Barlett 3). 
(Hall	  &	  Krueger	  15)	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groups in favor of the current regulations.  However, ridesourcing firms have stricter background 
check policies than those seen in any major taxi market.  Uber’s screening  
requires that an applicant driver have none of the following on his or her record 
over the past seven years: hit and runs, fatal accidents, reckless driving, violent 
crimes, sexual offenses, gun-related violations, resisting or evading arrest, driving 
without insurance, or DUI or other drug-related violations or severe infractions. 
(Feeney 2015, 5) 
 
Uber also utilizes Hirease, an outside firm, to conduct background checks through public 
records, sex offender registries, the Multi-State Criminal Database, and federal and county 
checks.  In comparison, Chicago taxicab drivers cannot be guilty of a forcible felony28 within the 
last five years, or been on parole for a similar offense within the same period (Feeney 2015, 6).   
Chicago’s requirements appear stricter than most other cities, but Uber’s and Lyft’s screenings 
prove more comprehensive.  That is to say, “Uber’s and Lyft’s background check requirements 
are stricter than the screening requirements for many American taxi drivers,” as it is the taxi 
industry’s national norm to be a five year window for felonies (Feeney 2015, 6).   
 Uber and Lyft do not always require vehicle inspections.  Prior to hiring a driver, Uber 
reviews photos of the vehicle before approving them; additionally, all vehicles must be 2004 
models or newer (Feeney 2015, 8).  Lyft requires a formal car inspection prior to driver approval, 
and does not allow vehicles older than model year 2000 (Feeney 2015, 8).  As it stands, 17 U.S. 
states require periodic safety inspections for all private vehicles.  The constant rating system 
from consumer feedback represents another manner in which ridesourcing vehicles are regulated.  
Poor ratings and consumer comments about substandard vehicles encourage drivers to maintain 
safe and clean vehicles.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 A forcible felony is any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence 
against any individual (Feeney 2015, 13).  
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The uncapped supply is partially responsible for ridesourcing’s superior customer 
service, as “ridesourcing’s short wait times and consistency across time and location represent 
an important difference between ridesourcing and taxis from the user’s perspective” (Rayle 
11).   Rayle displays that the two major reasons consumers choose ridesourcing over standard 
taxicabs are ease of payment – 25 percent of individuals – and short wait times – 17 percent of 
individuals.  Table 11 demonstrates the consumer preferences revealed within Rayle’s study.  
The fact that only 3 percent of would be taxi consumers consider cheaper cost to be the reason 
they chose ridesourcing is surprising.  However, in the long run, cost will most likely become a 
greater factor in consumer decisions.  
 
Table 11: Consumers’ Reasons for Choosing Ridesourcing in San Francisco (2014) 
 
(Rayle 14) 
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Moreover, unregulated supply and the use of private vehicles allows for drivers who 
previously would not become taxicab drivers to provide rides.  By allowing drivers to freely 
enter and exit the marketplace, drivers gain more freedom.  As a means to additional income, 
many drivers will operate strictly during high demand periods - to and from work, weekends, 
bar closings, and around major events.  The larger supply of drivers increases matching 
efficiency.  
B. Demand 
Ridesourcing applications allow demand to be tracked and understood in a unique 
manner.  The ability to track consumer’s locations via smartphone technology can help improve 
service and create shorter wait times and improved service.  For example a San Francisco study 
found that only 35 percent of residents claimed they waited less than ten minutes after calling a 
taxi to their home; conversely, 90 percent of ridesourcing respondents said yes to the same 
question (Rayle 11).  Table 12 below demonstrates the complete studies findings.   
Some “findings indicate ridesourcing serves a previously unmet demand for convenient, 
point-to-point urban travel” (Rayle 1).  Ridesourcing’s convenience and reliability promotes 
increased demand from the consumer market.  Its ease generated additional trips to be taken, 
thus raising overall demand above that seen within the previous taxicab market.  Within Rayle’s 
San Francisco study, 92 percent of ridesharing users stated they would have still made the trip, 
with only 39 percent stating they would use a taxi.  Thus, ridesourcing induced 8 percent of the 
trips, while also shifting consumers who would not normally take taxis into the marketplace. 
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Table 12: How would you have made the trip if ridesourcing were not available? (2014) 
   (Rayle 13) 
   
In January 2015, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick stated that the San Francisco taxicab 
revenues were about $140 million per year.  Moreover, in 2014 Uber’s San Francisco revenues 
reached nearly $500 million per year (Blodget).  San Francisco represents Uber’s first and most 
developed marketplace in the world, and therefore should be considered a lead market indicator.  
Ridesourcing will likely enjoy success in cities with similar demographics to San Francisco, 
such as “a strongly restricted taxi supply, scarce parking, an incomplete public transit 
system…and a large population of high paid young professionals” (Rayle 17).  Similar cities 
include Boston, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.; however, these other factors might stimulate 
growth in different markets.  Ridesourcing’s ability to provide service to previously unmet 
demand is a key component within the marketplace.  San Francisco demonstrates that 
consumers are more willing to utilize ridesourcing’s services than they were those of taxicabs.  
The San Francisco experience shows that ridesourcing is expanding the marketplace, rather than 
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simply taking taxicab market share.  As adoption increases throughout some of ridesourcing’s 
less developed markets, consumer demand will continue to increase.  
Similarly, New York City data demonstrate ridesourcing’s ability to expand the 
marketplace into areas not adequately served by taxicabs.  “Internal Uber data shows that 26.3 
percent of the company’s pick-ups are made in boroughs outside Manhattan, as compared to 6.3 
percent of pick-ups for yellow cabs” (Griswold).  Thus, ridesourcing possesses the unique 
ability to better serve previously unmet consumer demand.  The increased information available 
via ridesourcing dynamically links drivers and consumers in an efficient manner, reducing 
search costs that both parties previously experienced.  The experiences in both San Francisco 
and New York City demonstrate that ridesourcing is not only disrupting the taxicab 
marketplace, it is expanding it.  By meeting previously unmet consumer demand, ridesourcing 
applications appeal to consumer preferences. 
C. Competition 
The existence of three major ridesourcing applications promotes a high level of 
competition among the firms.  Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar compete for both riders and drivers as 
they continue to mature and develop.  Uber stands as the market leader, with a valuation of $40 
billion29, a business model aimed at providing professional service, and largest vehicle and 
market sizes (Mac).  Lyft represents a formidable competitor that is focused on friendly service 
and has been valued at $2.5 billion30 (Kharpal).  Both firms utilize similar pricing models that 
will be discussed at length.  Sidecar differs from Uber and Lyft in that it allows individuals to 
choose rides based on vehicle, price, and estimated time of arrival, as drivers themselves price 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Uber’s most recent round of venture funding came in December 2014, when it raised $1.8 
billion at a $40 billion valuation (Mac). 
30 Lyft’s most recent round of venture funding came in March 2015, when it raised $300 million 
at a $2.5 billion valuation (Kharpal).	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rides. As it relates to riders, innovation, consumer experience, and pricing will determine the 
success and failures of each company.  For consumers, competition further promotes superior 
service and ride quality.   
Competition also greatly benefits drivers, as firms compete for drivers in each 
city.  Compensation, benefits, insurance coverage, and consumer preference will greatly 
influence a driver's decision when choosing between ridesourcing firms.  For example, both 
Uber and Lyft currently attempt to draw drivers to their application with $1,000 bonuses 
following a single completed ride (LyftvsUber.com).  The competition between the two firms 
for drivers will continue to create net gains for drivers moving forward.  Drivers can work for 
both Uber and Lyft at the same time in order to increase their chances at fares, decrease their 
waiting time between fares, and increase earning in a more efficient manner.  Currently, Sidecar 
operates in only five cities, and faces a difficult task of gaining market share from the two 
ridesourcing leaders.   
D. Price 
The competition between Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar will place prices at competitive levels.  
Table 13 exhibits that UberX, the cheapest service, costs less than traditional taxis in almost all 
major cities. 31  Many consumers will make their decisions based on price, thus the fact that 
ridesourcing’s standard fares are cheaper than those of traditional taxicabs gives them a 
competitive advantage.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The table does not reflect that Uber decreased the price of UberX by 20% in New York City in 
order to become cheaper than taxicabs (blog.uber.com) 
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Table 13: Cost of an UberX and Taxicab Rides in Select Cities (October 2014) 
     (Silverstein) 
Unlike taxis, there is no physical meter as the smartphone application generates the 
fare.  The existence of multiple firms creates a competitive pricing market unlike the regulated 
taxi marketplace.  Uber and Lyft set fares themselves within each city, and consistently	  have	  the	  same	  price	  as	  the	  competitor	  in	  each	  location	  (Lyft	  vs	  Uber).	  The lack of pricing 
regulation, along with the unregulated supply, creates an environment with fares below that of 
taxicabs during normal periods within UberX and Lyft.32  During periods of high consumer 
demand and low driver supply, peak load pricing - called “prime time” by Lyft and “surge 
pricing” by Uber - goes into effect, as discussed below.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The more premium service, UberBLACK, is more expensive.  	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Seattle’s attempt at deregulation demonstrated the difficulty of drivers setting their own 
rates; nonetheless, Sidecar is aiming to promote such a model, and fare oversight completely. 
The model greatly differs from that of Uber and Lyft, but provides an additional option for 
consumers.  Moreover, the ability to predict trip fares through the ridesourcing firm’s website 
further increases consumer knowledge regarding a trip - as GPS systems easily estimate the 
time and distance of a potential trip.  A customer’s ability to know the price allows for her to 
fairly judge the ride’s utility and make decisions accordingly.     
E. Surge Pricing 
As mentioned, ridesourcing firms raise prices when demand outpaces supply.  Surge 
pricing increases the fare by a given multiple.  Lyft’s prime time pricing algorithm will increase 
fares from 25 to 200 percent according to shifts in supply and demand.  Likewise, Uber’s surge 
pricing can increase fares anywhere from a 1.2 times multiple to 7 times.  Both firms’ pricing 
algorithms automatically go into effect when potential consumers outpace potential 
drivers.  Off-duty drivers receive real time updates regarding surge pricing as means to 
incentivize them onto the road or into certain neighborhoods.  That is, “given that [ridesourcing] 
drivers are setting their own schedules and respond predictably to financial incentives,” peak 
load pricing serves as a logical means of induce drivers onto the road (Feeney 2014, 
3).  Similarly, ridesourcing consumers demonstrate their pricing preferences when deciding 
whether or not to accept a higher fare.  Following an individual’s request for a ride, he is 
notified that surge pricing is in effect and asked whether he would like to accept the higher fare, 
or be notified when surge pricing ends.  Table 14 provides useful information for consumers 
hoping to make informed decisions between Uber surge price and taxicab fares. Moreover, Uber 
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requires the consumer to type in the multiplier as a second means of confirming the price (Table 
14).  
Table 14: Uber’s Surge Pricing Accept Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The real time responses ridesourcing applications provide means pricing resets every two 
minutes in response to riders and drivers entering and exiting the marketplace; however, when 
an individual accepts the higher rate both rider and driver are committed.    
F. Summary 
Information represents the key factor that improves overall efficiency and quality within 
the ridesourcing marketplace.  The ability to immediately connect drivers and riders, while 
transmitting real time location services to each party creates an improved experience on both 
ends.  Ridesourcing’s rise greatly benefits consumers through lower prices, more transparent 
and shorter wait times, and improved customer service; likewise, driver’s benefit from increased 
demand, increased freedom, and a decrease in extracted surplus.  
Growth is a large part of ridesourcing’s story.  As demand increases throughout the 
country, driver supply will continue to increase as well.  An Uber leak from November 2013 
(blog.uber.com)	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revealed the firm completed around 850,000 rides per week, or 121,000 a day.  In December 
2014, Uber’s Head of Global Safety Phillip Cardenas posted that Uber was completing about 1 
million trips each day (blog.uber.com).  One year’s growth of eight times displays the rapid 
adoption and expansion of the firm, and hints at its strong potential for continued development. 
X. Drivers and Ridesourcing 
 Earlier it was demonstrated that taxi medallion’s gain their value from projected lease 
payments from drivers; furthermore, lease payments extract the surplus income that is above a 
taxicab driver’s opportunity cost. Rather than creating uniform lease costs to produce profits as 
in the medallion system, the ridesourcing system connects firm profits to driver profits. 
Ridesourcing firms charge 20 percent of each fare as compensation for the matching service the 
application provides. Thus, ridesourcing’s pricing policy more closely resembles the system in 
place prior to the advent of leasing in 1979.  This system compensates drivers based on their 
willingness to take fares.  
 However, it costs ridesourcing firms very little to add a driver to its platform.  The 
creation of the application and its maintenance represent the major costs incurred by the 
ridesourcing firms.  The addition of new drivers to the platform is the cost of background 
checks and insurance coverage.  
 Taxi drivers and ridesourcing drivers have similarities and differences, the most 
important of which deal with compensation.  The main similarity is that both are independent 
contractors.  According to the IRS, independent contractors “are generally considered self-
employed” (IRS).  As mentioned, the classification significantly decreases costs to the employer 
because laws do not require employers to contribute to social security, workers’ compensation, 
and unemployment insurance for independent contractors.  Since medallion leasing’s inception 
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in 1979, the law has considered taxi drivers as independent contractors.  Two new, independent 
lawsuits from employees against Uber and Lyft aim to reclassify drivers as employees rather 
than independent contractors.  A favorable judgment would further disrupt the marketplaces 
organizational structure and pricing.  The IRS states that for employees, employers “must 
withhold income taxes, withhold and pay Social Security and Medicare taxes, and pay 
unemployment tax on wages paid to full-time employees” (IRS).  In such a case, ridesourcing 
firms must also cover expenses such as vehicle maintenance, gasoline, and other miscellaneous 
operating expenses.33  A ruling in the driver’s favor would dramatically shift driver 
compensation, greatly increase ridesourcing firm’s costs, and also potentially impact taxi 
drivers’ status.  The likely outcome of such a scenario would be increasing the 20 percent 
charge, again decreasing driver wages to their opportunity cost.  
The possibility remains that ridesourcing drivers stand somewhere in between employees 
and independent contractors, and could be treated as a new breed of workers.  Because legal 
distinctions between employees and contractors are fine, it is difficult to classify ridesourcing 
drivers and the level of control the business exerts on them. “Uber drivers can choose which 
hours they work and how much they work, both hallmarks of an independent contracting job” 
(Lowrey).  On the other hand, like employees, drivers are monitored on a real time basis, and 
can be terminated by local managers (Lowrey).   
Ridesourcing firms consider themselves intermediaries helping facilitate transactions 
between riders and drivers, and receive 20 percent of each total fare.  Thus, drivers gross 80 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In a 2014 court decision, FedEx Ground’s independent contractors were deemed employees 
and awarded damages to cover vehicle, logo, route, and uniform purchases.  A major difference 
between the FedEx and ridesourcing contractors is it was necessary for FedEx Ground 
employees to work full time or risk being fired.  Additionally, while FedEx	  driver	  were	  required 
to purchase specific van types, Uber drivers can select vehicles of their choosing (Rooney).	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percent of each fare.  Much like taxi drivers, ridesourcing drivers must cover general operating 
expenses including gasoline and cleaning fees.  The distinct difference occurs with lease 
payments and vehicle ownership.  While taxi drivers lease the medallion and the vehicle for a 
given period of time, ridesourcing drivers normally utilize their personal vehicles when 
providing service.  Such a distinction provides strong benefits for ridesourcing drivers, reduces 
the potential for multiple car payments, and improves vehicle quality.  If taxi drivers own a 
vehicle as well as lease a taxi, they in essence face two car payments.  By driving his own car, a 
ridesourcing driver gains the ability to use the vehicle for recreational purposes throughout the 
day, week, and year.  Unlike taxi drivers, ridesourcing drivers may easily transition out of 
service if necessary.  Private vehicle ownership should increase ridesourcing driver’s overall 
welfare.  Additionally, owners typically treat possessions with a higher level of respect and car; 
therefore, one might expect higher quality and cleaner vehicles in the ridesourcing marketplace.  
Ridesourcing driver insurance serves as a major point of national media attention. 
Because UberX and Lyft drivers simply utilize their own vehicle insurance, they themselves are 
not covered to utilize their vehicles commercially.  Therefore, ridesourcing firms cover drivers 
“from the time a driver accepts a request for a car until that passenger is dropped off” for up to 
$1 million of primary coverage for death, injury, and damages when the ridesourcing driver is at 
fault or the other party is not adequately covered (Feeney 2015 9).  In comparison, New York 
City requires driver liability insurance covering $100,000 per individual or $300,000 per 
incident.  Recent regulations from Colorado and California match ridesourcing firm’s current 
insurance policies, and demonstrate positive and necessary regulations of the ridesourcing 
industry.      
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Uber’s labor market report as completed by Jonathan Hall and Alan Krueger 
demonstrates the superior well being of what Uber considers its “Driver-Partners.”  Data 
suggest Uber drivers greatly differ from traditional taxi drivers.  Table 15 shows while 51% of 
Uber drivers work between 1 and 15 hours a week, 81% of taxi drivers worked more than 35 
hours (Hall & Krueger 20). Moreover, Table 16 demonstrates that Uber drivers earn 
significantly more per hour than taxi drivers across numerous cities when taxi drivers and 
chauffuers.   
Table 15: Distribution of Uber Drivers and Taxi Drivers by Hours Worked (October 2014) 
 
(Hall & Krueger 20) 
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Table 16: Uber Drivers’ Earnings Compared to Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs’ Wages 
(October 2014) 
 
   (Hall & Krueger 23) 
Uber drivers’ higher average hourly earnings and lower driving times reveal an overall 
increase in an individual’s utility relative to that of a taxicab driver.  The flexibility to choose 
one’s own schedule and the increased incentive to drive through higher earnings, promotes a 
driver’s leisure and economic well-being.  Furthermore, it is important to realize that 
ridesourcing drivers are not simply converted taxicab drivers.  Rather, they appear to be 
individuals with different opportunity costs.  For instance, “62 percent of Uber driver-partners 
are either working full-time or part-time on another job,” representing a distinct difference in the 
opportunity costs of ridesourcing drivers and taxicab drivers (Hall & Krueger 17).  Moreover, 37 
percent of Uber drivers posses a college degree, compared to only 15 percent of taxi drivers 
(Hall & Krueger 8).  Therefore, while it is fair to say that Uber provides increased utility for its 
drivers relative to taxicab drivers, it is wrong to assume that taxicab drivers shifted to become 
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ridesourcing drivers. At the moment, it appears that Uber drivers and taxicab driver are not 
analogous individuals; rather, the typical Uber driver possesses a higher opportunity cost than the 
typical taxicab driver. 
XI.  Ridesourcing Regulations and Responses 
 Ridesourcing firms began operations within a legal gray area. Because ridesourcing firms 
currently operate outside taxicab regulations, and instead serve as independent vehicles for hire, 
new regulations are required.  Colorado and California became the first states to create 
regulations designed specifically for ridesourcing firms.  By the end of 2014, seventeen 
American cities and four states successfully passed legislation aimed at legalizing and regulating 
ridesourcing firms in a manner favorable to the firm’s current business model (MacMillan). 
Unlike taxicab regulation, ridesourcing regulation has largely been moved to the state level.  
Because ridesourcing firms cover more geographic area than previous taxi fleets, state-wide 
legislation is a logical solution.   
 Regulator’s attitudes towards ridesourcing firms have shifted greatly during the past year.  
Strong taxi lobbies and high levels of uncertainty surrounding the business led to numerous cities 
outlawing ridesourcing firms.  Despite these difficulties, ridesourcing firms persevered, and now 
display a desire to become legally operating firms in cities and states across the country.  
Ridesourcing’s lobbying and consumer preferences represent key reasons for the shift within the 
regulatory environment.  
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A. Ridesourcing’s bans and expansion 
Ridesourcing’s new approach to transportation poses a regulatory issue for many cities 
across the United States.34  Numerous cities have chosen to ban ridesourcing as they attempt to 
create regulations for the new firms.  Las Vegas, NV; Portland, OR; and Fayetteville, AR have 
created regulations rather than allow ridesourcing firms to operate within a legal gray area.  
Ridesourcing’s largest ban came from the state of Nevada; in December 2014,  “the Nevada 
Transportation Authority requested and received an injunction against Uber Technologies Inc. 
for operating as a taxi service” (Street). Also in December 2014, Portland sued Uber, “calling it 
illegal and asking the Multnomah Country Circuit Court to declare that the service is subject to 
city taxi laws” (Huet).  Fayetteville police officers began ticketing Uber drivers in November 
2014, stating the company lacked the proper permits to operate in the city (Lanning). Anti-
ridesourcing regulators often state that safety, insurance and licensing rules are necessary for 
operation within their cities.  Furthermore, strong taxi regulations and lobbyists within cities 
aided in enacting the bans.   
Uber first began its launches into new cities by willingly operating within the legal gray 
area, and lobbying for local legislation as a secondary course of action.  In many cities, the 
ridesourcing firm succeeded, as consumers demonstrated their preference for ridesourcing as a 
viable alternative to taxicabs.  Portland’s regulators “did not appreciate the company’s shoot-first 
approach,” when they decided to sue the firm (Huet). Despite complaints, Uber operated in 
Portland by New Years Eve 2014 “with a commitment from officials to create a regulatory 
framework for Uber within the next three months” (blog.uber.com). In recent launches, Uber 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Many European markets have actively opposed ridesourcing services. Most notably, Berlin, 
Germany banned Uber in court due to passenger safety considerations.  Similarly,	  French police 
raided Uber’s Paris office as part of an investigation into licensing and insurance requirements.	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lobbied for legal status prior to launching in new cities, as was the case in Little Rock.  By 
creating a legal operation prior to launching, Uber avoids the headaches of operating without 
legal status.  Table 17 depicts the change in strategy, as legalization moves more in line with 
launch date.  The table also demonstrates the rapid expansion process Uber has undergone.  
Moreover, by creating a legal framework in Arkansas’s state capital, Uber initiated March 2015 
legislation to legalize the service throughout the state (Grossman). The chart below demonstrates 
Uber’s rapid expansion, as well as the decreasing time between the launch and legal operation 
periods. 
 
 
Table 17: Pace of Regulation and Uber Launches (December 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Macmillan & Fleisher) 
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As of April 2015, Las Vegas stands out as the largest American city in which Uber does 
not operate.  Furthermore, Uber now operates in 156 North American cities, many of which are 
smaller than Las Vegas.  Las Vegas’ strict taxi laws along with the taxi regulatory body being 
state governed make it difficult for ridesourcing firms to operate without the risk of fines and 
formal charges.  Push back from taxicab employees and owners is not limited to Las Vegas, as 
cab drivers and owners across the country sue local cities and ridesourcing firms in an attempt to 
halt ridesourcing operations.   
B. Colorado 
 California and Colorado took the initiative in formulating state laws to regulate 
ridesourcing companies.  Colorado’s law, Senate Bill 14-125, was created with the following 
response in mind35 
Concerning the regulation of transportation network companies, and in connection 
therewith, requiring transportation network companies to carry liability insurance, 
conduct background checks on transportation network company drivers, inspect 
transportation network company vehicles, and obtain a permit from the public utilities 
commission. (Jahn)  
 
Colorado’s bill, signed on June 5, 2014, clearly defines and outlines the various phases seen 
within a ridesourcing fare36, and outlines the liability and insurance coverage assumed within 
each.  Colorado’s law expressly states its intent of limited regulation.  The main aspects of 
regulation include but are not limited to: insurance coverage reaching the level of one million 
dollars in the event of an incident at any point during an arranged ride, a requirement for 
insurance coverage at all points of driving, a requirement that drivers and riders must be matched 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 As previously mentioned, regulatory bodies across the country refer to our previously defined 
“ridesourcing” firms as “transportation network companies” or “TNCs.” 
36 Points/stages of driving refers to the stages of an Uber driver’s business: becoming an 
available driver, driving to a fare, and driving the consumer.  
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within the application platform,37 a requirement for vehicle inspections at least one time per year, 
and requirements surrounding background checks for applicant drivers (Jahn). As mentioned, 
ridesourcing firms did not previously require mandatory inspections on all vehicles; this 
represents the single key regulation enacted within Colorado’s law that did not match previous 
policy.  In addition to vehicle inspections, the Colorado statute requires the ridesourcing firms 
gain operation approval and a permit from the Public Utilities Commission.  
C. Policy Recommendations 
 Nationally, ridesourcing continues to gain legal status at a rapid pace within local and 
state regulatory environments.  Cities and states continue to develop legislation aimed at 
allowing ridesourcing’s operation in a manner deemed safe for the general population. With that 
in mind, legislation should follow Colorado’s example for ridesourcing regulations.  Legislation 
should require driver background checks, insurance coverage for all aspects of a ride, and yearly 
vehicle inspections.  Additionally, states should require drivers to register for commercial38 
licenses, as a means to increasing state revenues, further screening drivers, and developing a 
database of known ridesourcing drivers.  Massachusetts’s April 2015 proposed bill would 
command ridesourcing services obtain a license from the state Department of Public Utilities, 
where “the law would require companies…to provide the state with a list of its drivers and their 
addresses” (O’Connor).  The bill also requires vehicles use an external marker to better identify 
themselves to the public.  Following the lead of states such as Colorado, California, and 
Massachusetts, the key issues policy makers should concern themselves with are driver, 
passenger, and civilian safety, rather than market regulation.  Although ridesourcing firms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Drivers cannot accept street hail rides.	  38	  Commercial licenses would allow states to maintain a database of ridesourcing drivers, and 
also create a licensing fee that that could be used for state roads or to pay vehicle inspectors.	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developed their own policies, it is important that local legislative bodies develop a legal 
marketplace within which ridesourcing can operate.        
 The key aspects of the basic economic model, price and supply, should remain 
unregulated.  As individuals familiarize themselves with the model, consumers will become 
more educated when making consumption choices.  Therefore, it should not be necessary for 
legislative action to regulate ridesourcing pricing or supply.  
XII. Ridesourcing’s Outcome 
 Ridesourcing represents an innovative and disruptive business model within the taxicab 
marketplace.  The development of taxicab applications that attempt to replicate the ridesourcing 
business model demonstrates its attraction.  Ridesourcing will see its greatest disruption in cities 
that lack the high density necessary for constant street hails.  New York stands out as the 
metropolitan area where street hails will remain a frequent form of transportation.  That is not to 
say ridesourcing applications will not disrupt New York City, only that taxicabs will remain a 
part of everyday life for the foreseeable future.  In every other city across the country, 
ridesourcing applications pose a significant threat to the current taxicab business model because 
of density39.  New York City’s, specifically Manhattan’s, high density makes it efficient for both 
riders and drivers to utilize street hails because of potential low waiting times; in every other 
city, ridesourcing provides significant improvements by decreasing waiting times and increasing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Manhattan has the highest population in the country by far, with Los Angeles in second. “New 
York’s population-weighted density is much higher than L.A.’s in close proximity to city hall, 
roughly 80,000 people per square mile compared to between 20,000 or 30,000 for L.A.” 
(Florida).  Additionally, this fact fails to account for the high number of commuters to 
Manhattan. Close proximity to city hall indicates the population one square mile from the city 
hall, frequently the city center.  Therefore, this measure compares the densest area of each city 
and is a logical measure for estimating the area’s foot traffic, where street hailing cabs would be 
most common.  
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consumer knowledge. The potential for lower consumer fares, higher quality rides, and higher 
driver earnings will further shift consumption away from the taxicab marketplace and towards 
ridesourcing applications.  Moreover, the ability to quickly and accurately call a ridesourcing 
driver to one’s location will induce rides not previously taken with taxicabs or public 
transportation.  The San Francisco test case demonstrated the platform’s ability to increase 
overall demand. 
With regard to taxi medallions, it is logical to assume that they will greatly depreciate to 
zero across the country. Those in New York City will retain some value as the city maintains a 
certain number of street-hail taxicabs due to Manhattan’s high density. As demonstrated, the 
value of medallions comes from the ability to attract drivers and lease payments.  As 
ridesourcing applications and taxicabs compete for drivers, there will be fewer people willing to 
pay high lease fees.  Additionally, drivers will move in tandem with consumers; as more 
consumers adopt ridesourcing as their preferred transportation, the opportunity cost of not 
driving for a ridesourcing firm becomes too high. In the fall of 2014, New York City saw the 
value of taxicab medallions at auction fall 17% from $1,320,00 in 2013 to $872,000 (Table 18).    
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Table 18: Rise and Fall of New York City Taxicab Medallions (Fall 2014) 
 
 
(Barro 2014) 
  
The decrease in medallion prices displays a belief that future lease payments will 
decrease.  In April 2015, a New York Taxi mogul, Evgeny Freidman, became locked in litigation 
as Citibank attempted to seize 87 of his taxi medallions (Barro 2015).  Freidman apparently 
cannot find drivers willing to pay the legal maximum lease fees, and therefore is failing to pay 
off his loans.  As Freidman requests a bailout from New York City, one must consider whether 
or not medallion owners deserve compensation for the decline in their assets.  Capitalism and 
investing rationale argue against Mr. Freidman’s call for a bail out.  First, medallions were 
financed with a certain amount of investment risk – a knowledge that their value could rise or 
fall. Secondly, the process of creative destruction that is capitalism is meant to induce innovation 
	   63	  
and development.  Financing former technologies goes against capitalist thought, and sets a 
dangerous precedent for the future.  Innovation in the 21st century continues to accelerate, and 
markets such as energy will also be disrupted. America’s capitalistic society is built to promote 
innovation, not stifle it. As markets are created, others are destroyed.  Ridesourcing’s rise to 
prominence was rapid.  It is up to consumers to make logical, reasonable, and informed decisions 
through their actions as a means to demonstrating their informed preferences and influencing 
regulators; it is up to legislators to respond to preferences, help create a safer and more 
cooperative marketplace within which innovation can operate.  The taxi marketplace’s continued 
expansion through ridesourcing is only the most recent instance of creative destruction, and 
certainly will not be the last.   
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